PCT Home
Perceptual Control and Human Data Fusion
 

1. Introduction

2. Modes of Perception

3. Perceptual Control Introduction

4. Perceptual Control and imagination

5. Hierarchic Perceptual Control

6. Multiple data sources

7. Learning and Conflict

8. The Bomb in the Hierarchy

9. Degress of Freedom in the individual

10. Degrees of Freedom in the organization

11 Modes of Perception (Reprise)

12. Side Effects and Military intelligence

13. Communication

Side effects of Control

What is meant by "Side Effect" in PCT?

Side effects affect aspects of the world that do not enter into the controlled perception. They are always wasteful, and may be dangerous.

The next few slides deal with those effects on the world that do not affect the controlled perceptual signal of an ECS. They are called "Side Effects." To detect them needs a different perceptual input function in a different ECS. Side effects are wasteful of energy and resources, but in the context of competition they can be worse.

The actions that do serve to control the perception are not normally observable outside the ECS, because their effect on the environment of the ECS is to oppose almost exactly an environmental disturbance. The net effect of disturbance and useful output is zero. Side effects do not oppose disturbances, and are directly observable. They may afford clues to an opponent about what the ECS is really doing.

Side Effects as source of intelligence data

The objective of all action is to control one's own perceptions. Conflict occurs when the actions required to control one's own perceptions make it difficult for someone else to control theirs and vice-versa. Unless other means are available to one side or the other for control of the relevant perceptions, the actions of each tend to become more extreme, leading to stronger side effects that are available for observation. Both sides may be well able to control low-level perceptions, though not those that lead to the conflict itself. One function of the commander is to frustrate the enemy's low-level control, and to do this it is necessary to determine what is being controlled—the enemy's intentions or reference signals. Observing the side effects of the enemy's invisible control actions can help in making this determination.

Side Effects as source of intelligence data:

Stealth Technology

Stealth Technology is all about reducing side effects.

  • Controlled Perception: Own vehicle at some desired location.
  • Action: Moving vehicle to desired location
  • Side effects: Noise; Alterations of Electromagnetic fields Changes of radar reflections etc.
  • Consequence: Enemy detects actions to control perception, and may infer the reference
    signal (the goal).

Deception

Deception is all about changing interpretation of side effects.

  • Controlled Perception: Own vehicle at some location.
  • Side effects: Noise; Alterations of Electromagnetic fields; Changes of radar reflections etc.
  • Deception: Accept that movement will be detected, but make it plausible that it is a side effect of controlling some different perception.

Probing Side Effects as source of intelligence data

It is ordinarily very difficult to determine what perceptions anyone is controlling. The only real way is to try to disturb some Complex Environmental Variable (CEV) that you hypothesize corresponds to the perception being controlled, and see whether the other person restores it. In Perceptual Control Theory, this procedure is elevated to the capitalized status of "The Test." The Test works, but is hard to apply in practice. If the complexity of the CEV is non-trivial, the Tester may actually observe a related CEV that has many elements in common with the one corresponding to the controlled perception, and thereby mistake which perception the other is controlling. There is no easy way around this, except to keep changing the CEV that the Tester disturbs, and evaluate the precision with which the other restores it.

In a competitive situation, any Test probe attempting to disturb a perception the opponent is controlling can provide the opponent with information about one’s own intentions. Powerful though it may be, direct application of the Test to determine the controlled perceptions of the opponent can be dangerous. There is an intelligence adage “To find out what the enemy intends, find out what the enemy is asking.” One can probe to a certain extent, but not enough to determine the actual CEV corresponding to the enemy’s objectives.

Side effects come from actions that correct for disturbances to CEVs that correspond to controlled perceptions. One can observe the side effects of actions that the opponent uses to control perceptions disturbed by external factors (or, perhaps more importantly perceptions for which the enemy has changed reference values), but it is the luck of the draw what disturbances or changes in reference values occur. If one wants to determine whether the enemy has a particular intention (i.e. a controlled perception), one must try to frustrate that intention (i.e. disturb that CEV). The difference is the same as that between passive sonar, which detects noises made by a submarine as it moves and as its support systems operate, and active sonar, which perturbs the ocean in a way that depends on whether a submarine is present. The submarine cannot detect a passive sonar surveillance system, but it can always detect that it is being scanned by active sonar. Passive sonar cannot detect quiet submarines, but active sonar can.